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HE MULTIPLIER MODEL of the money
supply, originally developed by Brunner (1961)
and Brunner and Meltzer (1964), has become
the standard paradigm in macroeconomics and
money and banking textbooks to explain how
the policy actions of the Federal Reserve in-
fluence the money stock. It also has been used
in empirical analyses of money stock control
and the impact of monetary policy actions on
other economic variables.
One important feature of tins model is that it
decomposes movements in the money supply in-
to the part that is due directly to Federal Re-
serve policy actions (the adjusted monetary base)
and the part that is due to changes in technology
and the tastes and preferences of depository in-
stitutions and the public (the money multiplier).
In this decomposition, the multiplier is assumed
to be independent of the policy actions of the
central bank. The independence is implicitly
predicated on the assumptions that the demands
for both checkable deposits and currency are
determined by the same factors, and that indi-
viduals can quickly and costlessly alter their
holdings of currency and checkable deposits to
achieve the desired proposition of the two alter-
native forms of money.1 Open market purchases,
for example, increase reserves and consequently
checkable deposits; but the public simply shifts
from checkable deposits to currency until the
(unchanged) desired ratio of currency relative to
checkable deposits is once again achieved. Be-
cause policy actions have no impact on the pub-
lic’s holdings of currency relative to checkable
deposits, the multiplier does not depend directly
on the policy actions of the Fed.
This article investigates the theoretical and
empirical validity of the key feature of the mul-
tiplier approach. In theory, the multiplier is in-
dependent of the policy actions of the Federal
Reserve only if the demands for currency and
checkable deposits are determined by identical
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1The notion that the multiplier is independent of Federal
Reserve actions—implicit in the work of Brunner and
Meltzer (1964, 1968) and, more recently, in Plosser (1991)
—has never been demonstrated rigorously with micro-eco-
nomic principles. The argument presented here that would
suggest such independence is implicit in works as early as
Fisher (1911).48
factors and if , conditional on these factors, these
demands are strictly proportional. From an em-
pirical perspective, this condition is necessary
but not sufficient; the degree to which the mul-
tiplier is influenced by policy actions also de-
pends on the strength of the relationship be-
tween policy actions and checkable deposits.
An empirical analysis shows that most of the
variability of the observed ratio of currency to
checkable deposits is due to variation in check-
able deposits, and thereby suggests that the de-
mand for currency is not strictly proportional
to the demand for checkable deposits. Prior to
the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA), how-
ever, the link between reserves and checkable
deposits was quite loose—so much so, that the
notion that the multiplier is independent of pol-
icy actions was operationally valid. Nevertheless,
the empirical relevance of this notion has weak-
ened considerably since the implementation of
the MCA in the early 1980s. Since then, the re-
lationship between Fed policy actions and
checkable deposits and, thus, the multiplier has
tightened markedly.
The evidence presented here, that the multi-
plier is not independent of Federal Reserve ac-
tions in the post-MCA period, raises some ques-
tions about the appropriateness of using the
monetary base as an indicator of the effects of
policy actions on the money stock. More impor-
tant from a policy perspective, it also suggests a
modification of the standard approach to money
stock control that might yield substantial im-
provements in effective monetary aggregate
targeting.
THE MONEY MULTIPLIER
APPROACH: A SIMPLE: EXAMPLE
As a starting point for understanding the de-
composition of the money supply into the mone-
tary base and the multiplier, note that the nar-
row money stock, Ml, is defined as
(1) Ml, = TCD, + C,,
where TCD denotes total checkable deposits and
C denotes the currency held by the nonbank
public. The monetary base (MB), not adjusted
for changes in reserve requirements, is simply
the sum of currency and reserves (including
cash in the vaults of depository institutions) in
the banking system, R:
(2) MB,= C,+ R,.
Currency, supplied by the Federal Reserve on
demand, reflects the portfolio decisions of the
public rather than monetary policy actions. Re-
serves, in contrast, can be affected directly by
the Fed’s sales or purchases of government se-
curities in the open market.
For simplicity, assume that the Federal Re-
serve has a simple system of reserve require-
ments, with required reserves, RR, given by
(3) RR,= rTClJ,, 0- cr < 1,
where r denotes the ratio of reserves that must
be held against TCD.2 A change in the reserve
requirement ratio, r, also would constitute a
monetary policy action by the Fed.
Furthermore, for simplicity, assume that ac-
tual reserves always equal required reserves so
that excess reserves are identically zero. With
this simplifying assumption, equation 3 can be
rewritten as
(4) H, = rTCD,.
The model is completed by assuming that cur-
rency is held in some proportion, k, of TCD.
That is,
(5) C, = kTCD,,
where the proportion k, hereafter called the k-
ratio, is the public’s desired ratio of currency to
TCD holdings.
Combining equations 1, 2, 4 and 5 produces
the monetary base-multiplier representation of
the money supply:
(6) Ml, = m MB,,
where m, the money multiplier, is given by
(7) m = (l+k)I(r+k).
According to this representation, a policy action
that increases R by one dollar, through open
25ince the Fed eliminated reserve requirements on all non-
transaction deposits in December 1990, this representation
approximates the current system. For convenience of ex-
position, the discussion to follow abstracts from reserves
that depository institutions must hold on government and
foreign transactions balances.
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market purchases of government securities, in-
creases MB by one dollar and the money stock
by m dollars.~
In this representation, policy actions are
reflected not only in MB, through changes in H,
but in m, through changes in r. With a simple
adjustment to MB, however, the effects of pol-
icy actions on the money supply can be isolated
in one measure. This alternative measure of the
monetary base, called the adjusted monetary
base, AMB, reflects both changes in H and r. It
is constructed by calculating the hypothetical
level of reserves that would have been required
under the reserve requirements in existence dur-
ing a chosen base period for the current (actual)
level of reservable deposits. With the chosen
base period, changes in required reserves due
to changes in reserve requirements, r, are
added to the monetary base.~
Specifically, the AMB is given by
(8) AMB, = MB, + RAM,,
where the reserve adjustment magnitude, HAM,
is defined as
(9) RAM, = (r*~.~J.)TCD,.
This adjustment measures the reserves released
or absorbed by changes in r relative to r*, the
required reserve ratio during the base period.
In the base period, RAM is zero and AMB = MB.
A decrease in r from its base-period level (r*)
releases reserves into the banking system and
thereby increases RAM and AMB. Conversely,
an increase in r reflects the reserve drain by
reducing RAM and AMB.
Combining equations 1, 4, 5, 8 and 9 yields
the following decomposition of Ml,
(10) Ml, = m* AMB,,
where
(11) m* = (l+k)I(r*+k).
In this characterization of the money supply pro-
cess, all changes in monetary policy, through
changes in r or H, are reflected in the AMB.
Changes in the multiplier reflect only changes
in the public’s desire to hold currency relative
to checkable deposits, changes in the k-ratio.~
Because, in this model, the k-ratio is not directly
influenced by the policy actions of the Fed, the
multiplier is independent of policy.




Interest in the currency-deposit ratio dates
back to Fisher (1911), who was concerned that
the two forms of money had different income
velocities. He realized that these two monies are
imperfect substitutes: currency is especially use-
ful for making small, “face-to-face” transactions,
while checkable deposits provide a convenient
means for making large, ‘out-of-town”
transactions.
Fisher reasoned, however, that individuals
achieve an ‘equilibrium” in their holdings of the
two forms of money. The notion of a desired or
optimal k-ratio is based on the assumption that
individuals decide how much of their money
holdings they will allocate between currency
and checkable deposits, based on both the rela-
tive advantages of each in undertaking an indiv-
idual’s planned transactions and their relative


















3Note that because r< 1, m >1. If the assumption that ex-
cess reserves are not held were replaced by the assump-
tion that they are held in a fixed proportion, e, of TCD,
then the denominator of the multiplier would include e as
well, so that the multiplier would be smaller than that
shown in equation 7.
4See Tatom (1980), for example, who discusses the issue
of choosing the appropriate base period in light of changes
in the structure of reserve requirements. This theoretic
discussion focuses on the measure of the adjusted mone-
tary base constructed at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. See Garfinkel and Thornton (1991) for a more de-
tailed discussion of this measure and a similar one con-
structed by the Federal Reserve Board.
‘In a slightly more realistic model, which allows for the fact
that depository institutions must hold reserves on govern-
ment and foreign transaction balances, m* = (I +k)l
(r(1 +g+f) + k), where g and f denote the ratios of gov-
ernment and foreign transactions accounts to TCD, re-
spectively. If, in addition, excess reserves were held, as
described in footnote 2, m = (1 .+.k)l(r*(1 +g-i-f)+k÷e).
These complications can be ignored, however, because
movements in the observed ratio of currency to TCD ex-
plain most of the movements in the multiplier, as will be
discussed shortly.50
function of a number of economic and social
variables.°
Given these variables, the demands for cur-
rency and checkable deposits were thought to
be strictly proportional to each other. More-
over, because individuals are free to adjust their
holdings of the two monies quickly and costless-
ly, it was assumed that the actual currency-
deposit ratio would deviate from the desired
ratio for only a short period of time.’ According
to this line of reasoning, all changes in the
observed currency-to-deposit ratio, denoted here
by the K-ratio, are to be interpreted as changes
in the desired ratio caused by one of these fac-
tors. While not numerically constant, as it was
assumed to be in the previous analysis, the k-
ratio was viewed as not being directly affected
by monetary policy actions.
The following discussion, supported by subse-
quent empirical analysis, suggests, however, that
the observed ratio of currency to checkable
deposits can be and has been affected directly
by the policy actions of the Federal Reserve.’
This effect can emerge without changing the
relative advantages of currency and checkable
deposits or their relative holding cost.
Substitutability, Holding Costs and
the Optimal k-Ratio
There ai-e a number of reasons why one
might question the assumption that changes in
the observed currency-to-deposit ratio necessar-
ily reflect changes in the optimal k-ratio—that
is, changes in the relative holding cost and ad-
vantages of currency and checkable deposits.
First and perhaps foremost among these is that
the demand for either of these forms of money
might depend on a number of special factors
that are unrelated to the demand for the other.
i’hus, changes in the relative advantages of
these two forms of money might not be empiri-
cally important in explaining changes in the
ratio of currency to checkable deposits.
For example, many believe that currency has
no rival for illegal transactions. The same is
true for foreign demand for U.S. currency by
countries that need “hard currencies” for their
domestic transactions.’ To the extent that cur-
rency is held for these reasons, independent of
factors that determine the demand for check-
able deposits, policy actions can induce changes
in TCD without affecting currency demand. Con-
sequently, policy can alter the ratio of currency
to ltD and, hence, the multiplier.”
One might also argue that changes in the rela-
tive holding cost of the two monies are not es-
pecially relevant for explaining observed changes
in the currency-to-deposit ratio. The relative
holding cost of the alternative monies is given
by the difference between the rates of return
on the two forms of money.” The return on
holding currency is zero.” Although non-inter-
est-bearing checking accounts (demand deposits)
have an explicit return of zero, they can yield a
‘Fisher assumed that the optimal k-ratio depended on real
income or wealth, the degree of development of the
business sector, population density, relative holding costs
and custom and habit. (Checkable deposits were thought
to be “superior” to currency, although money in any form
was a superior good.) Cagan (1958) extends the list of
determinants of the k-ratio considerably. Both he and Hess
(1971) attempt to quantify the effects of such factors.
7Cagan (1958) recognized that, at times, restrictions might
prevent the adjustment of the currency ratio. He explicitly
considered the case of financial crises where banks sus-
pended convertibility. He noted, “At these times individ-
uals could not exchange deposits for currency, and the
desired currency ratio undoubtedly exceeded the actual
ratio...” Without such restrictions, however, individuals are
free to adjust their currency holdings to the desired level
very quickly and at a low cost.
The assumption that there exists a desired currency-to-
deposit ratio and that individuals adjust their actual hold-
ings of currency to their desired level was made opera-
tional for models of the money supply process by Karl
Brunner and Allan Meltzer in a series of articles. See
Brunner (1961) and Brunner and Meltzer (1964, 1968).
effect of policy actions on economic variables such as real
income or interest rates. It is argued that such variables
influence the k-ratio or the other ratios that make it up—
particularly, the ratio of excess reserves to total checkable
deposits. See Mishkin (1989) for a more detailed discus-
sion of this indirect effect.
‘Because it is difficult to account for a relatively large
amount of the total stock of U.S. currency outstanding,
one should not be too surprised to tind that, in the ag-
gregate, demand for currency and checkable deposits are
not closely related. See, for example, Avery, Elliehausen,
Kennickell and Spindt (1986, 1987).
“’This potential influence is illustrated below with an exam-
ple. To be sure, longer-run movements in the K-ratio might
be attributable to some factors that affect the relative ad-
vantages for the two forms of money.
“The discussion to follow focuses on the nonbank public’s
perspective. The relative holding costs to depository in-
stitutions generally will differ.
“Adjusted for inflation, it is minus the expected rate of infla-
tion. Note that currency used for illegal transactions yields
a greater return because of the tax avoidance. For foreign-
ers, currency can yield a return that diners from zero due
to the appreciation or depreciation of their home currency
relative to the U.S. dollar.
‘It has long been recognized that policy actions can have
an indirect effect on the multiplier through the presumed1 51
positive implicit return—for example, free toast-
ers for new customers, subsidized accounting
and payment services, etc. The return on hold-
ing interest-bearing checking accounts is the net
interest paid on these accounts plus free pay-
mnent services.’3
The relative holding cost of currency and
demand deposits, however, is unresponsive to
movements in market interest rates because the
explicit returns to both assets are identically
zero. Surprisingly, the same seems to be true
for currency and interest-bearing checking ac-
counts, even since the elimination of Regulation
Q ceiling rates in 1986. Interest rates paid on
interest-bearing checkable deposits included in
TCD have been unresponsive to movements in
short-term interest rates.’4 Despite the fact that
the explicit holding cost of currency relative to
that of checkable deposits has changed little, the
observed ratio of currency to checkable depos-
its exhibited sharp swings during the 1980s.
Thus, it is unlikely that changes in the public’s
holding of currency and checkable deposits are
due primarily to changes in their relative hold-
ing cost.
The Holding qf Currency,
Checkable Deposits and Other
Financial Assets
Thus, it would not appear that individuals
simply shift their money holdings between cur-
rency and checkable deposits in response to
variations in their relative advantages or holding
cost. This conjecture would be reinforced by
the fact that currency and especially checkable
deposits are substitutes for other “near-money”
stores of wealth, for example, money market
mutual funds. From this broader perspective,
the demands for currency and checkable depos-
“Net interest is interest net of service charges. For a dis-
cussion of these, see Carraro and Thornton (1986). This
explicit return also could be adjusted for inflation.
“Indeed, interest rates on the interest-bearing portion of
TCD,called other checkable deposits (OCD), have changed
little during the 1980s. The rate on OCD fluctuated be-
tween 5 percent and just over 5.5 percent during our sam-
ple period.
“This consideration raises a fundamental question—namely,
what constitutes an appropriate monetary aggregate? In
theory, monetary aggregation requires the “monetary” ag-
gregate to be “weakly separable.” That is to say, it must
behave as a fundamental commodity with respect to con-
sumption and other financial assets. There can be
substitution between assets that compose the aggregate,
but not between those that compose the aggregate and
its are seen as being determined simultaneously
with the demand for near-money assets.”
An important part of the determination of the
ratio of currency to checkable deposits, there-
fore, is the degree of substitutability between
currency and demand deposits on the one hand
and between each of these money assets and
near-money assets on the other. Although the
explicit rates paid on TCD are relatively unre-
sponsive to changes in market interest rates,
rates paid on near-money assets can vary mark-
edly with variations in other market interest
rates. The effect of these variations on the pro-
portion of Ml held in the form of currency, of
course, depends on the degree of substitutabili-
ty between near-money assets and the two forms
of money. If currency is a relatively poor substi-
tute for such assets while TCD is a relatively
good one, the ratio of currency to TCD will
change with changes in rates paid on such near-
money assets because of changes in TCD.
The relevance of this substitutability between
TCD and other near-money assets appears to
have been heightened by the nationwide intro-
duction of interest-bearing checking deposits in
January 1981. Since then, the cross-price or in-
terest elasticity of the demand for checkable
deposits has increased. This increase is hardly
surprising because the payment of interest on
checkable deposits has made them closer substi-
tutes for interest-bearing time and savings de-
posits. Indeed, some evidence suggests that in-
dividuals have shifted a significant portion of
their “savings” balances into interest-bearing
checking accounts.” Because these saving bal-
ances are substitutes for savings and money
market accounts that have higher explicit re-
turns, the interest elasticity of the demand for
checkable deposits should have risen, while the


















those that do not. Some evidence suggests that, while cur-
rency and demand deposits satisfy this condition for weak
separability, these two assets plus interest-bearing transac-
tion balances do not. See, Fisher (1989), for example.
Belongia and Chalfant (1989), among others, however, find
that the data are consistent with the notion that the assets
included in Ml and a grouping broader than Ml (currency
and total checkable deposits) satisfy the weak separability
condition. Thus, the empirical results in this line of
research are not conclusive.
“See Sill (1990).
“See Thornton and Stone (1991) for a derivation of this
result. These results are borne out empirically by simple
linear regressions of the monthly change in both currency
and other checkable deposits on a scale measure and the
three-month T-bill rate.52
Thus, changes in interest rates, whether pol-
icy induced or not, can have an asymmetric ef-
fect on the demands for currency and checkable
deposits, with a direct effect on the proportion
in which the alternative monies are heldis Al-
though this asymmetric effect is likely to have
played a larger role since the introduction of
interest-bearing checking accounts in generating
fluctuations in the ratio of currency to TCD,
policy has induced changes in this ratio more
directly since the MCA (as discussed below).
•IJEPOSIT SUBSTITUTION AND
THE MONEY MULTIPLIER
Provided that the demands for currency and
checkable deposits are determined by factors
that are independent of one another, monetary
policy actions can have a direct influence on the
relative holdings of each and, thus, the multi-
plier.’” The channel of influence is most easily
illustrated in the extreme case where the de-
mand for currency is completely independent
of the demand for checkable deposits. That is,
equation 5 is replaced with
(5’) C, = C,
where C is a constant. Equation I also can be
rewritten as
(1’) Ml, = (1 + K,)TCD,,
where, as defined previously, K, = (C/TCD), is
the observed ratio of currency to TCD.2°
Using equations 1’ and 5’ in place of 1 and 5,
the money supply can be written as
(12) Ml, = m~’AMB,,
where m~’= [(1 + K, l/(r* + K,)].
The crucial difference between this expression
and equation 10 is that, here, policy actions at-
fect both the adjusted monetary base and the
money multiplier. To see why, consider a policy
action involving the purchase of T-bills in the
market by the Fed. This policy action increases
the stock of reserves and, assuming zero excess
reserves, ltD. In the ea,lier formulation of his
model, the K-ratio was assumed to be unchang-
ed; the increase in TCD would be accompanied
by a proportionate increase in currency, so that
the observed ratio of currency to TCD, K, would
not change. Thus, the effect of this policy action
on the money stock would be isolated in the
monetary base—the multiplier would be
unaffected.
ln the modified model, however, TCD increases
while currency is constant. Consequently, the K-
ratio falls and the multiplier, m’’, rises. In this
instance, the change in monetary policy is re-
flected both in the adjusted monetary base, be-
cause of a change in R, and in the multiplier
because of a policy-induced change in K. Al-
though this argument is made in terms of a stat-
ic model, the main point, that policy can in-
fluence the multiplier, would carry over into a
more realistic dynamic model. ‘I’wo of the more
salient features of the longer-run consequences
of this analysis are taken up in the shaded in-
sert on page 54.
THE RECENT BEHAVIOR
OF THE K-RATIO
Figure 1 shows the K-ratio and the observed
adjusted monetary base multiplier, Ml/AMB,
from January 1970 to November 1990. Note that
the multiplier is essentially the mirror image of
the K-ratio; the K-ratio accounts for much of
the multiplier’s short-run (month-to-month)
variability and for the .significant shifts in its
longer-run “trends.” Indeed, as shown in table
1, changes in the K-ratio alone explain over 80
percent of the month-to-month variahility in
“The same would be expected for changes in the level of
income. Indeed, Hess (1971) presents estimates indicating
asymmetric effects of both changes in interest rates and
income on the demands for currency and checkable
deposits. It should be emphasized that this effect of
changes in interest rates on the k-ratio is not the same as
that which was alluded to earlier--i.e., through the relative
holding cost of currency and checkable deposits (see foot-
note 8).
‘“Many researchers who have estimated currency demand
equations have abstracted from the relationship of curren-
cy to TCD. For example, see Hess (1971) and Dotsey
(1988).
20Because k is meaningless in this formulation, K, will not
equal k. More generally, currency demand can be thought
of as having two components, one related to TCD as em-
bodied in the k-ratio and the other unrelated to TCD, That
is, C, = C + kTCD,. In this more general formulation, the
k-ratio is determined solely by the relative holding cost of
currency and TCD and the substitutability between them
as discussed above.
C -- . In this case, K, = —a— + k. The restriction in (5),



















The K-Ratio and the Ml Multiplier
January 1970-November 1990
Table 1
Regression Estimates of Changes in the Multiplier on Changes
in the K-ratio
Period Constant K-ratio SEE R OW.
1/1970-’2/1980 000 --4 355’ 007 598 247
(035J f1394~
1/1981-H/1990 001 —3,714’ 005 818 249
(184) ~2302)
3!1984-11/1990 001 —3b04 004 854 302
‘i 35) (21 66j
.no.cales slansucal s’gn’ficance at the 5 pe”cent level
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thi’ cost is ccjnstalit. .\gain. these elation- both ilir’ cic’mmianct ‘cii cllrn’iit’.\ and the tie-
ships are assume’1 io lie linear in the natural omnd toe IC ft-
‘The parameler h might be thouqht oi as the ‘og of the op- ~Norn that. because the multiplier ~5 bounded. Ml and AMB
umal s~ratioretiecttng only the ‘dative advantages and must be cointograted
costs ot curuency and TCD55
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changes in the multiplier since the implementa-
tion of the MCA2’ The MCA tightened the link
between the K-ratio and the multiplier by
reducing or eliminating other sources of varia-
tion in the multiplier.22 While the MCA was im-
plemented in a series of steps from November
1980 to September 1987, its major features
were almost fully implemented by February
j93423 Since then, changes in the K-ratio alone
explain over 85 percent of changes in the
multiplier.
21The Durbin-Watson statistic for each of the equations in-
dicates significant, negative first-order serial correlation,
Because we are primarily interested in the explanatory
power of changes in the k-ratio as measured by the ad-
justed A-square, however, maximum likelihood estimates
of the equations adjusted for serial correlation are not
reported here. Nonetheless, there are no substantive dif-
ferences between the maximum likelihood estimates and
those reported in table 1.
22







The Relationship Between Total
Checkable Deposits and the
K4latio
Figure 2 shows the K-ratio, currency and
TCIJ. The behavior of these series suggests that
changes in the trend of the K-ratio are associ-
ated more closely with changes in the trend of
TCD than with changes in the trend of curren-
cy growth. For example, the sharp rise in the
23The MCA was first implemented in November 1980 and
was fully phased-in by September 1987. The empirically
significant features of the act were completed with the
Fed’s adoption of contemporaneous reserve requirements
in February 1984, so the sample was broken at this point.
See Garfinkel and Thornton (1989) for a discussion of





















Deviations of the Growth Rates of the K-Ratio
and Currency from Their Means










K-ratio in the early 1970s is associated with a
slowing in the growth of TCD. The decline in
the K-ratio in the early 1980s and its subse-
quent rise are clearly associated with a sharp
acceleration in the growth of TCD followed by
a sharp deceleration in its growth.
That TCD accounts for much of the short-
run variation in the K-ratio also is evidenced by
figures 3 and 4, which show, respectively, devi-
ations of the growth rate of the K-ratio from its
mean and deviations of the growth rates of cur-
rency and TCD from their respective means. As
shown in the figures, the month-to-month vari-
ability in the growth of TC]J is considerably
larger than that of currency. The variability of
TCIIJ more closely matches the variability of the
K-ratio than does the variability of currency.
While the growth rates of the K-ratio and TCD
are highly, inversely related, there is little
positive association between the growth rate of
the K-ratio and the growth rate of currency.
This observation is verified in table 2, which
shows the simple correlations between the
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Deviations of the Growth Rates of the K-Ratio
and Total Checkable Deposits From Their Means
January 1970 thru November 1990
K—Ratio TCD
40
and the K-ratio and for TCD and the K-ratio for
four periods of roughly equal length between
January 1970 and November 1990. tf variation in
the K-ratio were simply due to shifts between
currency and TCD, its variation would be equally
attributable to variation in currency and TCD.
This is not the case, however. The growth
rates of currency and the K-ratio were positive-
ly correlated during only two of the four peri-
ods. They were negatively correlated in the
other two, although the correlations are not sig-
nificantly different from zero. In contrast, there
is a strong, consistent negative correlation be-
tween the growth rate of TCIJ and the K-ratio
during all four of the periods. Figures 3 and 4
and the correlations reported in table 2 clearly









Correlations Between the Monthly
Growth Rate of the K-Ratio and the
Monthly Growth Rates of Currency and
TCD
K-ratio K-ratio
Period and currency and TCD
1/1970-12/1974 368’ - 901’
W975-12/1979 016 911’
1/1980 12,1984 112 - 955
11985-11,1990 266 — 951’
- nolcales statistical signi’-cance at the 5 perce-il level
1970 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 1990
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K-ratio is driven largely by movements in TCD.
Finally, as shown in figure 4, periods of per-
sistent deviations in the growth rate of TCD
above (below) its mean are associated with per-
sistent deviations of the growth rate of the K-
ratio below (above) its mean. Consequently, both
the short and long-run movements of the K-
ratio are associated with movements in TCD
rather than currency. The apparent importance
of TCD in influencing the K-ratio suggests that
K-ratio changes have not occurred simply
because of variations in the relative advantages
and holding cost of currency and TCD. That is
to say, changes in the K-ratio have not been a
simple result of the public’s desire to shift the
composition of Ml between currency and
checkable deposits.
The Link Between Total Checkable
Deposits and Reserves
Movements in the multiplier appear to be deter-
mined primarily by movements in the K-ratio,
which, in turn, appear to be determined pri-
marily by changes in TCD. The question that re-
mains is what determines the stock of TCIJ out-
standing? The models of the money supply pre-
sented above provide a simple answer: given
the reserve requirement ratio, TCD is deter-
mined solely by the amount of reserves supplied
by the Federal Reserve. This strong link arises
in this model because reserves are assumed to
be held only to support checkable deposits24
Prior to the MCA, commercial member banks
were required to hold reserves against all time
and saving deposits, while non-member banks
and other depository institutions were not re-
quired to hold reserves against their transaction
deposits in Ml. Because of these factors, the
link between TCD and reserves was not particu-
larly strong. In reducing or eliminating reserve
requirements on a number of non-transaction
accounts and extending reserve requirements to
all depository institutions, however, the MCA
significantly strengthened the relationship be-
tween TCD and reserves.
The effect of the MCA is illustrated in table 3,
which shows the results of simple linear regres-
sions of changes in TCD on changes in total re-
serves, ‘FR, for several periods between January
1970 and November 199023 The regression equa-
tions in this table (and in subsequent ones) are
intended to be illustrative and should not be in-
terpreted as alternative models for the money
supply process. (See the appendix for details.) In
all cases but the initial phase-in of the MCA,
there is a statistically significant relationship
between changes in TCD and TR. The strength
of the relationship, as measured by the adjusted
H-square, however, increases after the imple-
mentation of the MCA.2°The adjusted H-square
increases from .06 before the MCA to .67 after
the MCA. All of this improvement emerges in
the period after February 1984, when the ad-
justed R-square increases further to .83.27 More-
over, the reciprocal of the estimated coefficient
on TR is .124, very close to the marginal re-
serve requirement of .12 during the latter peri-
od. Indeed, the null hypothesis that this coeffi-
cient is equal to 1/12 cannot be rejected at the
5 percent significance level (the t-statistic
is 0.82).
241n reality, of course, depository institutions hold excess
reserves and are required to hold reserves on transaction
deposits other than those included in Ml.
25The total reserves measure used here is total reserves ad-
justed for reserve requirement changes, prepared by the
Federal Reserve Board.
26The Durbin-Watson statistic for the first time period sug-
gests that there is significant first-order positive serial cor-
relation, as would be expected given the likelihood of
misspecification (see the appendix). Maximum likelihood
estimates of this equation adjusting for first-order serial
correlation confirm this result. The estimated coefficient of
first-order serial correlation is -.314 with a t-statistic in ab-
solute value of 3.29. Nevertheless, the parameter
estimates after adjusting for serial correlation are generally
close to those reported in table 3, and they are statistically
significant. More important, the adjusted A-square only in-
creases to .147; hence, the dramatic rise in the adjusted
R-square in the 1980s is not due to the fact that total
reserve captures the autoregressive part of TCD.
27The switch from lagged to contemporaneous reserve ac-
counting in February 1984 might explain some of this ap-
parent improvement. To account for this possibility, the
change in TCD was regressed on both the contemporan-
eous and lagged change in TA. In no case was the coeff i-
cient on lagged TA statistically significant from zero at the
5 percent level. Indeed, the results differed little from
those reported in table 3. That the switch from lagged to
contemporaneous reserve requirements is of no significant
consequence is consistent with the conjecture of Thornton
(1983) and the empirical evidence presented by Garfinkel
and Thornton (1989). The relationship between TR and
TCD will likely become even stronger given the recent
elimination of reserve requirements on all time and sav-
ings deposits.
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Table 3
I Regression of Changes in TCD on Changes in Total Reserves
Total -
I Period Constant reserves SEE A’ OW. 1/1970-12/1980 .795’ 1.870’ 1.418 .062 1 35
(5.72) (3.10)
I 1/1981-11/1990 .742’ 7264’ 2.081 .674 223 (342) (15.64)
1/1981-2/1984 1 765’ 2.704 2.414 067 2.06
I (3.81) (1 92) 3/1984-11/1990 .441 • 8.082’ 1 676 .832 1.94 (2.09) (19.90)
I ‘ indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent levet Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses
I
Table 4
I Regression Estimates of Changes in the Multiplier on Changes
in Total Reserves
Total -
Period Constant reserves SEE A’ D.W.
I
1/1970-12/1980 — 003’ — .003 .011 .004 I 70
2 86) (0.67)
1/1981-11/1990 — 004’ .016’ 011 275 2.12
(3 28) (6.77)
I 1/1981-2/1984 002 - 003 .014 — 023 1 82 (0 77) (0.42)
3’1984-1i/1990 —.006’ 020’ .007 603 231
I ~6.05) ~11
- indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level
Absotute values of t-statmstmcs are in parentheses
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Regression Estimates of the Change in Ml on the Change on
Total Reserves and the Change in the Adjusted Monetary Base
Adjusted
Total monetary
Period Constant reserves base S E R 0 W
1I1970-12/1980 1328 2O79~ 1.529 066 128
(8 86) (3 20)
185 2.513 1312 312 1.54
(0 74) (7 73)
1/1981-11/1990 1888 7251 2 149 659 213
(834) (1512)
280 2773 2939 .361 1.39
(053) (823)
1/1981-2/1984 2613 2.910 2554 070 200
(5 33) (1 95)
1113 1839 2369 .200 186
(15) (320)
3/19841 /1990 1696 7995 1746 817 173
(7.73) (18.89)
1023 3158 3138 407 133
(1 43) (7 48)
indicates statis cat smgntficance at the 5 percent level
Ab otu e values oft statistics are in parentheses
the AMB I epor ted in table 5 beai this out.23 TR a rather stmple traightfot naid appi oach to
explains a i’d itit cIt small amount of the ~aria money stock control na s tmplied—namc It to
tion in changes in Ml before MC \ and ot cc 80 target the let ci of the adjusted monetart h tse
percent of the tariation of changes in Mi since consistent tt ith a money stock target conditional
early 1984. ‘the table also shott s that the cx- on a for cc ist of the multiplier, n her e the multi
plar~ator y potter of the monetary base has in- plier foreca t itas not conditional on the target
creased since the 1CA. as n ould be etpected.~ setting for the monetary base. I his notion also
\onetheless the explanatort pon er of the IAMB implied that the adjusted monetary base is the
declined significantly m elatit et othat of I H. be t indicator of the effects of polict actions on
the money stock.
The realization that the multiplier is not in-
I dependent of pohct actions suggests that the
monetary ba -e might not be the best indicator
Prior to the MCz\ tthen it appeared that the of policy actions on the monet stock and that
multiplier st as independent of policy actions retising the simple empirical models of the
8Again the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate significant that changes in TA explain much more of the variation in
serial correlation, especially when the AMB is used as the changes in Ml in the 1980s than do changes in the AMB
independent variable. In no case did an adlustment for even allowing for significant first-order serial correlation.
seria] correlation using a maximum likelihood technique 295ee Garfinkel and Thornton (1989) for a discussion of this
alter any of the substantive results presented in table 5 r~oint
That is these results too suggest that there is a marked
increase in the explanatory power of TA in the 1980s and1 61
money supply process to account for the effects
of policy actions on the multiplier could result
in improved money stock control. These issues
ace discussed briefly in this section.
The Adjusted Monetary Base as an
.Indicafor of Police Actions on the
Money Stock
The adjusted monetary base continues to
reflect all policy actions—changes in both re-
serves and reserve requirements; however, it
does not fully capture the effects of these ac-
tions on the money stock. Indeed, changes in
Ml are now more closely linked to changes in
TB than to changes in the IAMB. Consequently,
it now appears that total reserves, adjusted for
reserve requirement changes, is a better indica-
tor of the effects of monetary policy actions on
the money supply than is the adjusted monetary
base.
Furthermore, the quantity of currency out-
standing is demand-determined. Consequently,
unlike adjusted reserves, the adjusted monetary
base can give misleading signals of the course of
monetary policy when there are exogenous shifts
in the demand for currency.
To take a concrete example, currency growth
accelerated markedly beginning about December
1989.~° This acceleration was accompanied by
a sharp acceleration in the growth of the ad-
justed monetary base from 3.4 percent in 1989
to 8.4 percent in 1990. Such a sharp rise in
base growth would tend to indicate that mone-
tary policy had eased. But the growth of ad-
justed reserves and, thus, ‘I’CD indicate a sub-
stantially weaker easing of policy. TCD increas-
ed at a 1.2 percent rate in 1990 compared with
a -1.3 percent rate in 1989. Of course, the ap-
parent exogenous increase in the demand for
currency caused the K-ratio to rise and the mul-
tiplier to fall, so that Mi grew slowly relative to
the monetary base during the period.” Because
there is now a closer link between TB and MI
than between the IAMB and Ml and because TB
is less likely to give misleading signals, TB is
likely to be a better indicator of both monetary
policy and the effects of policy changes on the
money stock.
The Multiplier .zI.pproach to
Money Stock Control
That the multiplier is not independent of
policy actions also has important implications
for the multiplier approach to money stock con-
trol. Taking this approach, the target level of
Ml is achieved by forecasting the multiplier,
then supplying the amount of the adjusted mon-
etary base necessary to hit the desired Ml tar-
get-32 lf, however’, the multiplier is a function of
open market operations, policymakers must also
predict the effect of their actions on the multi-
plier. That is to say, the multiplier approach to
money control should be modified to take ac-
count of the effects of policy actions on the
multiplier. Taking account of such effects un-
doubtedly will improve money control over the
simple approach that assumes independence be-
tween the multiplier and policy actions. The
magnitude of this improvement depends on how
accurately the effects of policy actions on the
multiplier can be forecast. To the extent that
variations in the multiplier ace largely explained
by variations in the k-ratio and these variations
are, in turn, largely influenced by policy (espe-
cially in the post-MCA period), such a modifica-




















lcWhile the exact cause of this acceleration remains un-
clear, many attribute it (at least in part) to currency exports
to South American and Eastern bloc countries.
31An equally interesting, but less frequently discussed, epi-
sode occurred during 1989 when, after remaining fairly
constant, currency growth slowed abruptly. During this
period, the K-ratio rose rather than fell, as one might ex-
pect given the apparent shift in the demand for currency.
The increase in the K-ratio was driven by negative growth
in reserves and, hence, TCD during this period.
325ee Balbach (1981), Hafer, Hem and Kool (1983), and
Johannes and Rasche (1979, 1987) for a discussion ofthis
approach and for alternative methods that have been used
to forecast the money multiplier.
“Note that the multiplier approach can be more difficult to
implement. Most notably, the control problem becomes
nonlinear. One alternative approach would be to simply
forecast the level of currency, then supply the reserves
necessary to hit a target level of TCD. The target level of
TCD would have to be consistent with both the Ml target
and the forecast level of currency. Whether this or the
multiplier approach, suitably modified to account for the
effect of policy actions on the multiplier, would provide
greater monetary control is an empirical issue well beyond
the scope of this paper. Both approaches will produce
forecast errors when there are unexpected shifts in the de-
mand for currency. The real issue is whether better esti-
mates of the K-ratio can be obtained by estimating the
numerator and denominators separately than estimating
them together. This is an empirical issue. Nevertheless,
this alternative approach could be simpler to implement
and might provide superior control if reasonably accurate
forecasts of currency can be made.62
SUMMARY
This article has examined closely the standard
multiplier model of the money supply process,
specifically questioning the view that the ad-
justed monetary base multiplier is independent
of the policy actions of the central bank. Be-
cause the demand for currency depends on a
number of factors that are unrelated to the de-
mand for checkable deposits (and vice versa) and
because the stock of checkable deposits has
been more closely tied to the quantity of re-
serves supplied by the Federal Reserve since the
implementation of the MCA, changes in mone-
tary policy result in changes in the ratio of cur-
rency to checkable deposits and, consequently,
changes in the multiplier. Hence, the Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy actions are reflected
both in the adjusted monetary base and the
money multiplier.
Theoretical considerations suggest that the
multiplier has never been independent of policy.
The elimination of reserve requirements on
some non-transaction accounts and the exten-
sion of Federal Reserve reserve requirements to
all depository institutions has greatly increased
the association between checkable deposits and
reserves. These changes have increased signifi-
cantly the association between changes in mone-
tary policy actions and changes in the multiplier.
That the multiplier is affected by policy actions
suggests that money stock control using the
multiplier model would be enhanced by taking
the effect of policy actions on the multiplier into
account. How much improvement can be expec-
ted with this modified approach and how effec-
tive alternative approaches to monetary control
can be is left as a topic for further research.
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Appendix
A Model of the Money Supply Process
One might be tempted to interpret the regres-
sion equations in the text as representing alter-
native models of the money supply process; how-
ever, the reader is cautioned not to do so, In-
deed, as the article suggests, some existing mod-
els of the money supply process are misspeci-
fied. This appendix illustrates the bias of some
of the regression equations estimated in the
article.
The discussion in the paper suggests that, since
the MCA, there is a very simple linear relation-
ship between TCIJ and TR of the form
TCD1
= a + bTR1
+ e,,
where the coefficients a and b are constants
and ei saresidual error that is assumed to be
white noise. The error term arises because some
reserves are held against transaction deposits
not included in TCD and because depository in-
stitutions hold excess reserves. The constant
term, a, enters the equation because a lower
reserve requirement for a tcanche of checkable
deposits exists and because some of the vari-
ables omitted from this equation might have
non-zero means. If TR is correctly adjusted for’
changes in reserve requirements, including the
annual change in the deposit tranche, then the
coefficients a and b should be constant, where
bi sthe reciprocal of the marginal reserve
requirement—that is, b = l/.iZ = 8.33. The
discussion and the empirical evidence in the
paper further suggest that currency holdings
are independent of TCD, so that ç is simply ex-
ogenous from the perspective of money stock
control.
If this representation is true, then a regres-
sion of Ml on the monetary base is misspeci-
fied, because it imposes a restriction that is in-
consistent with the process generating the data.
‘I’o see this, consider the following regression
specification:
(A.i) Mi1
= g + sMB1
+ q,-
Given the definitions of Ml and MB, this equa-
tion can be rewritten as
(AZ) C, + TCD, = g + hTR1
+ jC~+ q~.
With the restriction h =j, equation A.Z is iden-
tical to equation A.i. The above analysis, how-
ever, suggests that the coefficient h should
equal 8.33 and the coefficient j should equal i.
If this is the case, imposing the restriction that
these coefficients are equal will be resoundingly
rejected by the data.
To test this hypothesis, first-difference specifi-
cations of equations A.I and A.2 are estimated
using monthly data for the period from March
1984 through November 1990. These estimates
use Federal Reserve Board data for the adjusted
monetary base and total reserves, adjusted for
changes in reserve requirements. These data
come close to satisfying the identity that the
monetary base is equal to the currency compo-
nent of the money supply plus total reserves.
These estimates ace presented in table A.i. in
the unrestricted version of the equation, neither
the null hypothesis that h = 8.33 nor the null
hypothesis that j = I can be rejected at the 5
percent significance level. The t-statistic for the
test that h = 8.33 is .59 and the t-statistic for the
test that j = i is .25. Hence, it is not surprising
that the restriction that h = j is soundly rejected
by the data.
It is interesting to note that imposing this
restriction biases the coefficient of the mone-
tary base multiplier away from its true value.
The estimated multiplier of 4.005 is nearly 50
percent larger than its average value during this
period. This bias emerges because of an omitted
variable.
To see this, note that equation A.2 could be
rewritten as either
(A.3) Mi, = g + hMB, + (j-h)C1
+
or
(A.4) Mi, = g + jMB~+ (h-j)TR, + q1.
Hence, equation A.i can be obtained by omit-



















Estimates of EquationsAl and Al
Constant AAMB ATA ,SC SEE OW
2099 4.005 3138 407 110
(249) (748)
.590 8090 908* 1690 828 193
(121) (1967) (251)
*Indl~tes statistical significance at the 5 percent level
Absolute values of tstatistics are tn parentheses
Table A 2
Estimates of Regression of ATCO on ATR and AC:
March 1984 November 1990
Constant ATR AC SEE 14 OW.
581 8069 =.115 1685 830 193
(119) (19.67) (032)
tindrcates statistical significanceat the 5 percent level.
Absolute values oft statistics are in parentheses
A.4. In the former case the estimate of hi s bias- TCD and currency, but is not significantly dif-
ed downward (4.005 vs. 8.33); in the latter case fecent from zero. Given this independence, it is
the estimate of j is biased upward (4.005 vs. 1). hardly surprising that cegre sions of changes in
Furthermore, the equation exhibits serial cor- Mi on TB and changes in TCD on JR produce
relation, a common indicator of misspecification. nearly identical r’e ults. Comparing the results
These results are not too surprising given that in table A.i with those in table 5 hows that the
the demand for currency appears to be indepen coefficient is biased downward slightly when
dent of the demand for TCD, a illustrated in Ml is regressed on TB Ihis occurs because C’,
table AZ, which shows the result of a cegces- is omitted from the right-hand side of the equa-
sion of changes in TCD on changes in IB and tion and because of the weak negati~ e associa-
changes in C. The coefficient on the change in tion between changes in both C,and TCD, and,
C is negative, indicating a substitution between hence, changes in TB, -